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EDITOR'S BRIEF 
A criminal justice system has two moral obligations to the rest of society when 
a dangerous criminal is apprehended. It should take measures to prevent the dan· 
gerous criminal from causing further harm and it should take action to compen-
sate those who have been injured by the criminal. For too long, our criminal 
justice system has shrugged both of these obligations. 
Different people will disagree over what is the best method to prevent a dan-
gerous criminal from inflicting further harm. Some might argue that social 
reform on a broad scale is needed. Others will claim that individual rehabilitation 
will suffice. Finally, others will maintain that dangerous individuals are incapa-
ble of being rehabilitated. Although no one knows for sure just what is the best 
method, one thing is certain: Our criminal justice system does not prevent violent 
criminals from causing further harm. We operate a revolving door system where, 
all too often, the only difference between the criminal walking in and the individ-
ual walking out is that the individual walking out is equipped with much more 
knowledge on how to victimize the law-abiding citizenry. 
A solution often disregarded, but indisputably effective, does exist: long term 
incarceration. A murderer locked up in the penitentiary is much less likely to kill 
a law-abiding citizen than a murderer roaming the streets. While it is unquesti-
oned that incarceration effectively prevents criminals from inflicting further 
harm on society, many people, nevertheless, believe that dangerous criminals 
should be given a second chance. Unfortunately, the second chance is all too often 
a second crime. Regardless, we have a system where people sentenced to life find 
themselves released on parole after serving only a few years_ It is this practice 
that causes our system to fail its first moral obligation. Rather than preventing 
further harms, our system, by releasing dangerous criminals out into the general 
public, is causing a harm. 
Having failed its first moral obligation, our system can only be justified if it 
meets its second obligation; compensating those injured by violent criminals. To 
acknowledge this obligation is to acknowledge that victims, too, have rights_ This 
. issue of The Colonial Lawyer is devoted to recognizing the rights of victims. 
Although ignored until recently, these rights are as basic to a free society as any 
others. It is fundamental that if we are willing to allow dangerous criminals free-
dom, we must also be willing to compensate those who suffer because of our 
tolerance. 
James S. Long 
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A MESSAGE FROM THE NEW DEAN 
It is a great honor having been chosen to succeed Dean William B. Spong. It is 
also a great responsibility. Under Dean Spong's leadership, our law school has 
made remarkable progress. We have moved from the brink of disaccreditation to a 
point where national distinction is in .view. I am confident that the next few years 
will bring us closer to achieving excellence in all parts of our educational 
program. 
Our law school has special strengths. We have a highly committed facuity, an able 
student body and exceedingly loyal alumni. We also have a uniquely distinguished 
history. Together these things make the hope of future progress quite realistic. 
No dean can accomplish anything of significance by himself. Success will be 
measured not by any personal achievements of mine, but rather by my ability to 
unite all parts of the law school community in a common effort to achieve impor-
tant goals. This spirit of affirmation and collaboration has characterized our law 
school for the 12 years I have known it. It is critical that we preserve it. Only 
through a sustained spirit of shared enterprise will the law school become all that 
we hope. 
In our eagerness to improve we should not forget to preserve the good things 
we already have. I include among these an atmosphere here which is founded on a 
sympathetic interest in each other as human beings. Lawyers are more than 
technicians. Great lawyers have an interest in the human spirit and in the hopes 
and dreams of individual men and women. We must continue to cultivate that 
spirit in our students, our faculty and our graduates. The best way I know to do 
that is to guard and nurture the present environment in which mutual concern is 
a common virtue. 
In some areas, improvements are needed. We must find more money to support 
student scholarships. We also need additional funding for faculty development. A 
number of important student activities such as the law review and moot court 
have achieved remarkable levels of excellence with inadequate financial resour-
ces. We need a new law school dormitory and additional space for smaller classes, 
student organizations and placement activities. 
Our faculty is devoted to the welfare of this law school and to its own 
improvement. Our faculty is still relatively young. Many of my colleagues are at 
the beginning of very promising careers. To the degree that their work brings 
them to the favorable attention of the national legal educational and professional 
community, our law school will benefit. To help each faculty member achieve his 
or her full professional potential requires more than the faculty member's per-
sonal commitment. It requires an institution able and willing to provide the 
financial and intellectual resources adequate to fulfill high aspirations. 
Our alumni are a special point of pride. We have an unusually loyal body of 
graduates. Their loyalty and willingness to devote time and resources to the law 
school have made the difference in nearly every important part of our educational 
program. I believe this commitment is a reflection of the special educational exper-
ience our law school provides. I will be looking for new ways to involve more of 
our graduates in the ongoing educational program of the school. 
All law schools share a fundamental obligation to educate their students to be 
good lawyers and to encourage their faculties to advance society's understanding 
of the law. The unique and distinguished history of the Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law imposes upon us an additional responsibility. That responsibility was best 
expressed by George Wythe who wrote not only for his time but for our own: 
"Here we must form such characters as may be fit to succeed those who have been 
useful in the national counsels of America." I hope that my service as dean will be 
remembered as a time in which the Marshall-Wythe School of Law strove with 
determination and some success to be worthy of George Wythe's great ambition. 
Timothy]. Sullivan 
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MR. JEFFERSON, THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 
AND THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME 
Frank Carrington* 
The movement on behalf of crime victims in the United States has been pre-
mised on a fundamental, albeit often unstated, belief that government-federal, 
state and local-has a moral obligation towards those who have been murdered, 
raped, robbed or otherwise violated by the criminal elements in our society. 
Actually, there is nothing new about this "moral obligation" theory. Thomas 
Jefferson summed it up in his Preamble to a "Bill for Proportioning Crimes and 
Punishments in Cases heretofore Capital" for the Virginia Legislature: 
Whereas, it frequently happens that wicked and dissolute men, 
resigning themselves to the domination of inordinate passions, 
commit violations on the lives, liberty and property of others, 
and, the secure enjoyment of these having induced men to enter 
into society, government would be defective in its purpose, were it 
not to restrain such criminal acts by inflicting due punishments 
on those who perpetrate them ... 1 
What Mr. Jefferson was referring to, in so many words, was that, because 
under The Social Contract, we, as citizens, have laid down our arms and 
entrusted the protection of our safety to the government, (i.e. police, prosecutive 
and correctional functions). Government has a moral obligation to protect its citi-
zens from the depredations of the lawless and violent. 
One would suppose that the law courts in this country, the self-appointed bas-
tions of our liberties, would have long ago resoundingly endorsed and enforced 
this moral obligation. As a matter of fact they have not. The liberal trend in 
American jurisprudence, simmerred on the stone of the pronouncements of the 
"Warren" Supreme Court (c. 1956-1978), was ever vigilant to enunciate, and even 
create out of whole cloth, "rights" protecting citizens from government, but little 
of a useful nature was put forward regarding the government's duty to protect.2 
The moral obligation espoused by Thomas Jefferson was consigned to obscurity. 
The State of West Virginia has, generally, an undeserved reputation of being a 
rather backward state. Aside from a recent, momentary flurry of publicity over 
the purchase of a seat in The United States Senate by West Virginia's Governor 
Rockefeller in 1984, one usually thinks of hillbillies, moonshiners and people of 
that ilk, if one thinks,at all of the Mountaineer State. 
Consequently, it is somewhat ironic that the only court decision holding four-
squore that government has a moral obligation to victims of crime arose in West 
Virginia. The "liberal and enlightened" states, for example New York,3 Pennsyl-
vania4 and California,5 have taken a stony attitude towards victims' rights when 
• Frank G, Carrington, Jr. is a practicing attorney in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and executive director of 
the Victims' Assistance Legal Organization 01 ALOR), He received his BA from Hampton·Sydney 
College in 1956, his LL.R from the University of Michigan in 1960, and his LL.M. (Criminal Law) 
from Northwestern University in 1970. 
I The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Washington, D.C. (1905) VoLl, p. 218 (Emphasis added). 
2 See, e.g. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U5. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1936). 
3 St. George v. State, 308 N.Y. 681,124 N£2d 320 (1954). 
4 Freach v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Comm. 546, 354 A. 2d 908 (1976). 
5 Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (1980). 
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it comes to litigation.6 Apparently alone, West Virginia has hued truly to the 
dictum of Thomas Jefferson. 
The case is State ex. rei. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims. 7 It is worth digesting at some 
length, as follows: 
On January 20,1945, Lucy Ward, a lady" ... past seventy-three years of age ... 
and a respected citizen of Randolph [West Virginia],"8 was raped and murdered 
by James Chambers, who walked away from the West Virginia Medium Security 
Prison at Huttonsville, where he was serving a life term for murder. The court 
characterized Chambers' record in prison, after his first murder commitment in 
1935, as follows: 
In 1941, during his confinement in the maximum security pene-
tentiary at Moundsville, Chambers attacked [another] female 
inmate of that institution [he had previously attacked a female 
inmate during his prison confinement] and stabbed her in the 
hip with a knife because she refused to have sexual relations 
with him. On another occasion he accosted her in the bathroom 
of the prison. For his misconduct he was punished by being con-
fined to his cell and restricted to two meals a day for a period of 
sixty days. Some time later, while working as a member of a 
prison road crew, he attacked a fellow prisoner with a knife. He 
was afterwards transferred to the [medium security] prison at 
Hu ttonsville. 9 
On the day of the murder of Miss Ward, Chambers left the prison unaccompan-
ied and unobserved, went to the nearby Ward farm, raped and murdered Miss 
Ward, and then returned to the prison. His absence from the prison was not 
known by the authorities until after the commission of the crime. (Chambers 
was later hanged for this crime.) 
Regarding conditions at the Huttonsville prison, the court found 
that prisoners were allowed to leave the prison at will, unac-
companied by any guard; that they had attempted to rape 
women in the neighborhood, for which they had not been pun-
ished; that they had been arrested for other offenses while 
absent from the prison late at night; that they possessed keys to 
gasoline tanks and outside buildings of the prison; and that the 
knife with which Chambers killed his victim was obtained by 
him from articles of prison equipment. There was neither prop-
er discipline nor adequate supervision of the prisoners. lo 
The court considered Chambers' record and the conditions at Huttonsville in 
combination, and found as follows: 
The recital of the foregoing undisputed facts indicates beyond 
question that the authorities in charge of the Huttonsville pri-
son and their agents completely disregarded the duty imposed 
upon them to keep Chambers securely confined to the prison at 
6 See generally, Carrington, Victims Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future, 11 U. Rich. L. Rev. 447 
(1977). 
7 46 S.E. 2d 90 \"N. Va. 1945). 
B [d. at 92. 
9 /d. at 92. 
10 /d. at 92. 
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all times. Instead they afforded him the opportunity to leave the 
prison at will, without their knowledge of his absence, and 
without any surveillance whatsoever of his whereabouts or his 
behavior. Those responsible for his confinement were fully 
aware of his vicious character and his dangerous propensity to 
engage in dangerous and murderous conduct. He was prone to 
commit revolting sexual offenses. His criminal record from 
April 1, 1935, when he murdered his first victim, and while he 
was serving his sentence of life imprisonment as punishment 
for that crime, gave warning of his dangerous and vicious dis· 
position and marked him as a killer and a sexual degenerate <1f a 
violent type. Those whose duty it was to guard him, and who 
disregarding that duty, failed to watch and confine him, should 
have known and indeed expected that he would commit rape or 
murder, or both, whenever the opportunity occurred for him to 
perpetrate either of those crimes. Instead of being kept in close 
confinement in the penetentiary at Moundsville during the full 
term of his imprisonment he was, without any excuse or dis· 
cernable justification, transferred to the West Virginia Medium 
Security Prison, which by statute was then deemed to be a part 
of the penetentiary, Section 1, Chapter 23, acts of the Legisla· 
ture of West Virginia, 1939, Regular Session, where he remained 
under relaxed and indifferent supervision and where he was 
free from any effective surveillance. In these wholly unwar· 
ranted circumstances that which should reasonably be expected 
to happen did occur. In reality a man known to be a killer was 
allowed to roam at will, unguarded and unobserved. It would 
have been surprising if, under those conditions, an event of that 
nature had not come to pass.!! 
The estate of Miss Ward filed a claim for damages resulting from her death. 
The State Court of Claims awarded the estate $2,500 and recommended to the 
legislature that it authorize payment. By a special act the West Virginia legisla-
ture found that Chambers' escape and subsequent murder of Miss Ward was due 
to "the gross and inexcusable negligence" of the prison authorities, and autho-
rized a $5,000 payment from state funds to her heirs for mental anguish and loss 
of her services. The state auditor refused to pay the amount on the grounds that: 
1) the allegations did not establish a "moral obligation" on the part of the state; 2) 
the payment would be void as a "gift"; 3) the appropriation was not constitution-
ally authorized; 4) the operation of the prison was a governmental function and 
the state was not liable for the acts or omissions of its employees; and 5) the state 
was immune from liability and had received no benefit for the payment. 
The respresentative of Miss Ward's estate brought an action in the West Virgin-
ia Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the auditor to make pay-
ment. The court ruled in favor of the estate and granted the writ. 
The court defined the issue as whether or not the facts, as alleged, created a 
"moral obligation" upon which the legislature could validly base an award of 
compensation. It held first that a legislative declaration of a "moral obligation," 
while entitled to serious consideration, was not binding on the courts; rather, it 
was up to the courts to determine whether the declaration comported with the 
law. It continued: 
II [d. at 92 (Emphasis supplied). 
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In the Cashman case, this Court stated a general rule by which, 
subject to certain exceptions, the existence of a moral obligation 
of the State in favor of a private person may be recognized and 
for the payment of which a valid appropriation of public funds 
in the public interest may be made by the legislature in any 
particular instance. An obligation or a duty, legal or equitable, 
not imposed by statute but· created by contract or resulting from 
wrongful conduct, which would be judicially recognized as legal 
or equitable in cases between private persons, is within the 
scope of the rule. 12 
The court held there was a duty on the part of the West Virginia correctional 
authorities to "exercise due care to keep the convict Chambers in continuous and 
secure confinement and to prevent his escape while his sentence of life imprison· 
ment remained in force and effect."13 It held that private persons or institutions 
charged with such a duty could clearly be held liable if that duty were breached, 
and so could the state. 
The court noted that, as a general rule, release or escape of a convict will not 
give rise to liability if the keepers were unaware of his or her vicious or danger· 
ous propensity to kill or injure others.14 The reason for the general rule was that 
the actions of the wrongdoer were not forseeable, that is, the state's actions were 
not the proximate cause of the injury. It held, however, that in the facts of the 
instant case, given Chambers' record and previous conduct, the murder of Miss 
Ward was forseeable: 
Before Chambers killed Miss Ward his vicious disposition and 
his propensity to attack and injure persons when in possession 
of a knife had been demonstrated upon at least two occasions 
while he was serving his sentence for the murder of his first 
victim, whom he destroyed by cutting her throat with a razor in 
1935. His previous criminal record and his dangerous character 
were known to the prison authorities to whose custody and con· 
trol he had been committed by the sentence of life imprisonment 
in the penetentiary. The natural and probable consequences of 
his freedom from secure and continuous confinement or res· 
traint, which should have been anticipated and forseen by his 
keepers, especially a female, whom he might encounter in cir-
cumstances which would afford him an opportunity for an 
attack of that nature. Yet with this knowledge, and by it 
warned that, if permitted to be at large, unwatched and 
unguarded, he would likely injure or kill a human being, they 
afforded him the opportunity to leave the prison alone while 
unaware of his absence and of his possession of a knife which 
he obtained at the very institution in which he should have been 
kept in strict confinement and denied access to any weapons at 
any time. That which, in the circumstances, could reasonably 
be forseen or anticipated by an ordinarily prudent person did 
occur. It should have been expected. The negligence of the officers 
and the agents of the state responsible for his secure confinement, 
12 /d. at 94 (Emphasis supplied), citing State ex. reo Cashman V. Sims, W. Va., 43 S.E. 2d 805 (1947). 
13 [d. at 94. 
14 [d. at 94 citing: 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Section 71, Henderson V. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 
251, 40 L.R.A. 95; Hullinger V. Worrell, 83 III. 220; Thomas V. Sloss·Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 144 Ala. 
188, 39 So. 715. 
8 
arising from these acts and omissions, was the proximate cause 
of the death of Miss Ward. Otherwise stated, her death was the 
natural and probable consequence of their negligent acts and 
omissions. 
A person is liable for damages occasioned by his negligence 
where they could reasonably have been anticipated by an ordi-
narily prudent person.15 
The court discussed the difference between a moral obligation (which was 
required to be declared by the legislature) and a legal obligation. The state con-
tended that it was legally immune from liability for actions taken in running the 
prison system. The court conceded this; however it continued: 
The doctrine which gives rise to a moral obligation of the state, 
in any particular instance, is not rendered inoperative by, and it 
is not incompatable with, the principle which recognizes the 
immunity of the state from suit, or the principle which denies 
the existence of a cause of action against it for the negligence of 
its officers, agents and employees. It rests upon considerations 
of an entirely different and independent character. If the state 
were subject to suit or action, or a cause of action existed 
against it for the negligence of its officers, agents or employees, 
while engaged in the discharge of a governmental function or in 
other activity or conduct; or if there were legal liability upon the 
state, or any legally recognized remedy for such against it, there 
would be no occasion for one aggrieved or injured to seek from 
the state, upon the basis of a moral obligation, the relief which 
he is denied by positive law but to which he would be entitled if, 
in the identical situation, an obligation or a duty would be judi-
cially recognized in cases between private persons. Only when 
the conduct of the officers or the agents of the state, for which it 
is not legally liable, is such that, if engaged in by private per-
sons, it would constitute the breach of an obligation, legal or 
equitable, which would be judicially recognized in cases between 
private persons, does the nature or the effect of such conduct 
require consideration in determining whether a moral obligation 
of this exists. And to give rise to an obligation of that character 
the factual situation must be such as to justify legislative action 
declaratory of its existence, and the obligation must be imposed 
upon or voluntarily assumed by the state by the enactment of 
constitutional legislation. 16 
The writ of mandamus ordering the state auditor to pay $5,000 to Miss Ward's 
estate was issued by the court. Other courts might well take the humanistic 
approach taken by the Supreme Court of West Virginia. 
15 Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936). 
16 46 S.E. 2d. at 98. 
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INITIATIVES IN VICTIMS ASSISTANCE 
Mandie M. Patterson· 
I. THE VICTIMS' MOVEMENT 
The criminal justice system has traditionally emphasized the rights of criminal 
defendants and; according to many, forgotten or ignored the legitimate rights of 
crime victims and witnesses. In the past few years, however, a trend has deve-
loped at the state and national levels in which the rights of victims and witnesses 
have been recognized and given attention. The growing responsiveness to the 
needs of crime victims and witnesses has burgeoned in the past decade. 
Although California enacted legislation creating the first state program to com-
pensate innocent victims of violent crime as early as 1965, the victims' movement 
did not really gain momentum until the 1970's and 1980's. Among the develop-
ments in the 1970's were the establishment of victim and witness assistance pro-
grams, an increase in the number of state victims' compensation programs, vic-
tims' legislation enacted by several states, and the formation of the National 
Organization of Victims Assistance (NOVA) in 1976. NOVA is an "umbrella" 
membership organization which coordinates victims' rights efforts nationally. 
A. Federal Initiatives 
1. The President's Task Force on Victims 0/ Crime. 
During the 1980's, victims' rights developments continued on both state and 
national levels. President Reagan appointed the President's Task Force on Vic-
tims of Crime on April 23, 1982. The Task Force, chaired by Lois Haight Herring-
ton, reviewed literature on victimization, interviewed professionals working with 
victims and heard testimony from crime victims-their friends and relatives. 
Hearings were conducted in Washington D.C., Boston, Denver, San Francisco, St. 
Louis and Houston. 
The Task Force completed its report in December 1982 and formally presented 
it to President Reagan in January 1983. This report contained sixty-eight recom-
mendations for action by, among others, criminal justice agencies, hospitals, Bar 
Associations and the private sector. One of the recommendations was to provide 
federal funding for victims' compensation and for services provided to victims. 
2. The Victims 0/ Crime Act 0/1984. 
This assistance was made possible when Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 19~4. President Reagan signed this Act on October 12, 1984. 
One of the components of this Act is the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 which will 
provide federal financial assistance to qualified state compensation programs and 
financial assistance to states for support of programs which provide services to 
crime victims. 
Virginia will participate in both aspects of the Act. Governor Robb has desig-
nated the state Department of Criminal Justice Services to administer the victim 
services program. The compensation program will be administered by the State 
Industrial Commission and its Division of Crime Victims' Compensation. 
Federal guidelines for the implementation of these two programs are at the 
time of this writing published in the Federal Register for draft review prior to 
being finally adopted. It is anticipated that funds for these programs will be made 
available to states during the latter part of calendar year 1985. 
* Mandie M. Patterson is associated with the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 
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3. The Justice Assistance Act 0/1984. 
Another aspect of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act is the Justice Assist-
ance Act of 1984. This Act provides federal financial assistance to eighteen desig-
nated target areas or proven effective programs. Of particular interest to those 
wishing to provide or improve services to crime victims and witnesses is the pro-
gram area which consists of assistance to jurors and witnesses, and assistance 
(other than compensation) to victims. Virginia will be participating in this Act. 
Funds for this program also will be administered by the state Department of 
Criminal Justice Services. 
4. Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982. 
Congress earlier enacted the Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection Act of 
1982 which provides as follows: 
a. a requirement for a victim impact statement containing all financial, social, 
psychological and medical effects of the crime on the victim, as part of fed-
eral pre-sentence reports; 
b. protection of federal victims and witnesses from intimidation; 
c. payment of restitution by offenders to victims of federal crimes; 
d. guidelines for fair treatment of victims and witnesses in federal crimes; 
e. a provision prohibiting a felon from profiting from the sale of the story of 
his crime (sometimes referred to as the Son of Sam provision). 
5. Office 0/ Justice Programs. 
In March 1983, President Reagan appointed the Chairman of the Task Force on 
Victims of Crime, Lois Haight Herrington, Assistant Attorney General for Justice 
Assistance, to implement the Task Force recommendations. The Justice Assist-
ance Act of 1984 established the Office of Justice Programs headed by Assistant 
Attorney General Herrington. The Office for Victims of Crime, created in July 
1983, is part of the Office of Justice Programs and is the agency which is charged 
with implementing the task force recommendations. This is being done, in part, 
by the establishment of a national resource center and development of model leg-
islation. Model legislation is being prepared by, among others, the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General. Training programs for professionals are being devel-
oped in conjunction with organizations, including the National Sheriff's 
Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, 
the National Judicial College, the National Organization for Victim Assistance, 
and the National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement Training. 
6. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence. 
In September 1983, the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence was 
created. This task force, like the earlier Task Force on Victims of Crime, con-
ducted hearings throughout the nation. The Task Force presented its report, 
including sixty-three recommendations for action, to the Attorney General in Sep-
tember 1984. 
7. National Victims Rights Week. 
In April 1981, President Reagan proclaimed the first National Crime Victims 
Week. Since that time, the designation has been repeated in 1982, 1983 and 1984. 
National Crime Victims Week in 1985 is scheduled for April 14 through 20. 
Ceremonies marking this week will be held in localities throughout Virginia. 
Governor Robb will sign a proclamation on April 17 designating that period as 
Crime Victims Week in Virginia. This ceremony is being planned by the Virginia 
Network for Victims and Witnesses and will be attended by members and other 
interested individuals. 
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B. State Initiatives 
The Virginia General Assembly has enacted a variety of victim related legisla-
tion in recent years. Among them are the following measures: 
L Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund. 
The Virginia Victims of Crime Act, establishing the compensation fund, was 
enacted by the 1976 session of the General Assembly and became effective on July 
1, 1977 (see Code of Virginia § 19_2 - 368-1 through 368-18)_ It provides for the 
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses for personal injuries suffered by victims 
who are not otherwise covered by insurance or public welfare_ The.Division of 
Crime Victims' Compensation is located at 1000 DMV Drive in Richmond and is 
administered by the State Industrial Commission_ 
Revenue for the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund is generated by the impo-
sition of an additional court fee against all criminal defendants convicted of a 
felony or a Class lor Class II misdemeanor (other than drunkenness or disorderly 
conduct). 
Amendments in 1983 included raising the limit on victims' compensation 
awards from $10,000 to $12,500 and the establishment of the toll free numbers for 
the Division of Crime Victims' Compensation. The General Assembly in 1984 
amended the eligibility criteria for awards and repealed the requirement that vic-
tims must have suffered financial hardship in order to be compensated for their 
expenses. Left intact was the $100 deduction for expenses. In 1985 changes 
included raising the limit on emergency awards to $2000 and increasing the limit 
on compensation awards to $15,000. Additional information about the victims' 
compensation fund may be obtained by contacting Mr. Robert Armstrong at the 
above address; telephone number (804) 257-8686. [Toll Free Number is (800) 
552-4007]. 
2. Victim Impact Statements. 
The 1983 General Assembly also allowed for the inclusion of a victim impact 
statement in pre-sentence reports. This gives the crime victim the opportunity to 
relate the physical, financial and emotional effects of the crime on himlher. Dur-
ing the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge may review the victim impact 
statement to consider the effects of the crime on the victim(s). 
3. Fair Treatment of Victims and Witnesses. 
House Joint Resolution 105, enacted by the 1984 General Assembly, urges 
police, prosecutors and other persons in the criminal justice system to assure that 
crime victims and witnesses receive " ... dignified, respectful, courteous and sen-
sitive treatment .. _" The resolution goes on to enumerate eight specific services 
to be provided to victims and witnesses. Among them are protection from threats 
and intimidation, referral to available social and financial services, separate wait-
ing areas and employer intercession services. 
4. State Funding of Victim- Witness Programs. 
The General Assembly in 1984 authorized the state Department of Criminal 
Justice Services to make grants, totaling $75,000, to localities for the purpose of 
funding programs to serve crime victims and witnesses. This year the appropria-
tion was more than doubled, so that $200,000 will be available for grants during 
the next state fiscal year. 
13 
5. Other legislation. 
Other victim related legislation includes provisions for victim restitution by 
offenders, funding of rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters. Addi-
tionallegislation provides for the appointment of interpreters for deaf and/or non-
English speaking victims. Considered also in 1985 was legislation relating to child 
victims. Legislation creating the Missing Children Information Clearinghouse 
was adopted. 
II. VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN VIRGINIA 
Several localities in Virginia have initiated, as a result of legislation passed by 
the General Assembly or prior to General Assembly action, programs to serve 
crime victims and witnesses. 
A. Objectives of Victim-Witness Programs 
Victim-Witness programs are designed to reduce the trauma of victimization 
and to increase witness cooperation in prosecuting cases. The major objectives Of 
victim-witness programs are: 
L Increasing the victim's access to counseling and other financial and service 
resources. 
2. Facilitating the victim's understanding of the law enforcement and criminal 
justice process. 
3. Producing greater law enforcement and criminal justice responsiveness to 
the victim's needs. 
J. Educating the victim about future crime prevention activities. 
5. Reducing the time and money lost by witnesses in a criminal case. 
6. Improving the amount of information received by victims and witnesses 
about the processing and outcome of their cases. 
B. Crime Commission Report 
In 1983, the Virginia State Crime Commission conducted an evaluation of these 
programs. At that time, there were fourteen victim and/or witness assistance 
programs in Virginia. Based on figures provided by eight of the programs, the 
Crime Commission estimated that these programs have "initial contact with a 
total of 40,000 victims and witnesses across the Commonwealth each year. If the 
other programs maintained these records, it could probably be demonstrated that 
the total number of contacts for all programs would be well over 60,000 persons 
on a yearly basis." 
C. Victim-Witness Programs in Virginia 
Since the publication of the Crime Commission's report, the number of victim-
witness programs in Virginia has increased to seventeen. After the establishment 
of the first program in Portsmouth in 1976 with Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) funds, five other localities - Virginia Beach, Lexington/ 
Rockbridge, Arlington, LeesburglLoudoun and Richmond - also inititated pro-
grams. When LEAA funding was discontinued, several of the localities assumed 
the costs of the programs themselves. In addition to these programs, there are 
eleven other programs in Virginia. Six of the eleven are state grant programs and 
five are partial programs. Partial programs do not have full-time program coordi-
nators and provide fewer services than the full-time programs. Of the seventeen 
programs in Virginia, twelve are full time and five are partial programs. (See 
chart for specifics.) 
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D. Programs in Other States 
On the national scene there are over 500 victim-witness assistance programs in 
the country, with programs in virtually every state. Beginning in Florida in 1974, 
these programs have burgeoned all over the country, primarily with the initial 
support of LEAA funds. The first ones were set up as exemplary projects in 
Alameda County, California, in 1974; Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1974; Brooklyn, 
New York in 1974; and Pima County, Arizona in 1974. Today at least nineteen 
states provide state revenue funding for the establishment and maintenance of 
these programs. With the passage of the federal legislation outlined earlier and 
the increase in state funding, it is expected that the number of programs provid-
ing services to crime victims will increase. 
E. Program Models 
There are three major program models-the victim model, the witness model 
and the victim-witness model. In recent years, especially with the initiation of 
state funding of programs, most of the programs in Virginia are based on the 
victim-witness model. 
Highlights of the types of programs are as follows: 
1. Victim Model 
a. Sponsor - generally hosted by law enforcement agencies, community based 
organizations, and local sponsors, such as city managers, mental health 
centers and human resource departments. 
b. Major objective - reducing the trauma of victimization and restoring the 
victim to hislher former state. 
c. Specific objectives -
(1) i~creasing the victim's access to counseling and other financial and ser-
VIce resources; 
(2) facilitating the victim's understanding of the law enforcement and crim-
inal justice process; 
(3) producing greater law enforcement and criminal justice responsiveness 
to the victim's needs; 
(4) educating the victim about future crime prevention activities. 
d. Clients are usually located -
(1) through telephone calls at the crime scene; 
(2) through routine screening of police reports; 
(3) through referrals from other agencies. 
2. Witness Assistance Model 
a. Sponsor -generally sponsored by Commonwealth's Attorneys. 
b. Major objectives - increasing witness cooperation and saving time for sys-
tem personnel. 
c. Specific objectives -
(1) reducing the time and money lost by witnesses in a criminal case; 
(2) improving the amount of information received by witnesses about the 
processing and outcome of their cases; 
(3) getting the witness to court. 
d. Clients are usually located by -
(1) a routine review of witness or subpoena lists; 
(2) referral from prosecutors; 
(3) referral from other agencies. 
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3. Victim· Witness Model 
Combines aspects of the victim model and witness model. 
F. State Grant Programs 
The Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) administers the $75,000 
state grant program. Because of the limited funds during its first year of opera· 
tion, DCJS limited the number of localities eligible to apply. Twenty·six eligible 
localities were selected based on proven experience in administering victim· 
witness programs, crime rate, violent crime rate, and number of cases initiated in 
circuit court. All these measurements were based on relative population. 
Six localities were awarded funds to help them establish new programs to 
crime victims and witnesses, or to expand existing services. The six-the cities of 
Alexandria, Roanoke, Chesapeake, Hampton, and Norfolk and Albemarle 
County-were among eleven jurisdictions which applied for funding. Guidelines 
for the second year of the program will be promulgated in the near future. Hamp-
ton and Norfolk did not have formal victim-witness assistance programs at the 
inception of the state program on July 1, 1984 and have used the grant funds to. 
initiate programs. The others have used funding to assist in expanding their 
existing services. Hampton's and Norfolk's programs operate through the offices 
of the Commonwealth's Attorneys, as do those in Roanoke and Alexandria. In 
Chesapeake, the Sheriff's Department provides victim-witness services; the Police 
Department has operated Albemarle County's program since July 1, 1984. 
State grant programs are required to perform three broad functions. These are: 
1. Assistance to victims and witnesses in dealing with the complexities of the 
criminal justice system. 
2. Provision of information and direction in applying for victims' compen-
sation. 
3. Provision of or referral to specialized counseling or social services for 
victims. 
In addition, programs must coordinate with community and social service 
agencies as well as agencies of the local criminal justice system. The use of 
volunteers is encouraged, as is providing public education and crime prevention 
information. 
III. BENEFITS OF VICTIM-WITNESS PROGRAMS 
Statistical analysis of program effectiveness on both the state and national lev-
els is limited. DCJS will be conducting an evaluation of state grant programs later 
this year. Despite the limited research efforts, there are indications that these 
programs are beneficial. In localities where programs exist, law enforcement, 
court service personnel, and prosecutors report measurable benefits. Common-
wealth's Attorneys, for example, report more victim cooperation and more suc-
cessful prosecution because victims and witnesses are more educated about court-
room procedure and less intimidated by their experiences in the criminal justice 
system. 
Several successful programs in Virginia have independently compiled data 
which demonstrates their cost-effectiveness. For example, in Virginia it has been 
shown that the annual savings incurred by the coordination of the trial docket 
and police officers' schedules is the equivalent of the annual salary for a full-time 
victim-witness coordinator. Similarly, it has been shown that the simple system 
of putting police witnesses "on call" has saved the annual starting salary of one 
full-time police officer. The heavy reliance of these programs on volunteers has 
significantly reduced operating expenses for the localities involved. For example, 
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Loudoun County's victim-witness assistance program estimates that in 1982 it 
saved the locality approximately $7,000 in staff time by its use of community and 
student volunteers. Likewise, Virginia Beach's program estimates a savings of 
$2,574.66 over a six month period. 
Reports also suggest that localities with victim-witness programs are more 
likely to utilize restitution and community services as alternatives to incarcera-
tion. In Loudoun County alone, $345,200.79 was collected in restitution for the 
year 1982. Furthermore, improved notification services by the victim-witness 
programs have eliminated a tremendous volume of court time which might oth-
erwise have been wasted as a result of delays and continuances. The best exam-
ple can be seen in the 80% reduction of "no shows" reported by. Alexandria's 
Commonwealth's Attorney's Office with initiation of a notification letter sent to 
all witnesses prior to their receipt of a subpoena. 
On the national scene, findings are similar to the results we have observed in 
programs in Virginia. In 1981 an evaluation of selected victim-witness assistance 
programs across the country by the National Institute of Justice revealed several 
significant benefits induding the following: 
A. System costs are reduced and system efficiency is increased. This is 
accomplished in 3 primary ways: 
1. Unnecessary waiting time for police is eliminated. 
2. The need for the prosecution to make initial contact with the witness is 
eliminated. 
3. Staff effort notifying and contacting the witness is substituted for 
efforts by the police and prosecution. 
B. Less police, lay, and expert witness time is spent waiting. 
C. Police time delivering subpoenas is reduced. Time and dollar savings are 
reported in several jurisdictions as a result of: 
1. Substitution of mail service for personal service. 
2. Substitution of phone alert for personal service. 
3. Substitution of project (civilian) personnel for police. 
D. Prosecutors are freed from notification and other witness management 
duties. 
E. Prosecutors receive improved witness information, and witnesses give bet-
ter testimony. 
F. Police sensitivity to victims and witnesses is increased significantly. 
G. Surveys of victims and witnesses indicate a far greater level of satisfaction 
with law enforcement and the criminal justice system in jurisdictions with 
victim-witness assistance programs than in those without them. 
IV. THE FUTURE 
With the passage of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, a potential $100 million 
will be available nationwide for funding programs which provide compensation 
and/or services to crime victims. In addition to this and other federal funding, 
more and more states are providing funding for programs. Coupled with the 
increased awareness of the need for better treatment of crime victims, it would 
seem that there will be an increase in programs in Virginia and nationally. There 
also will be more emphasis placed on providing services to "special" victims such 
as children, and victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Those programs 
should increase the criminal justice system's responsiveness to victims and wit-
nesses. Victims will be better educated about the criminal justice system and will 
demand more participation in the system. For example, victims will be interested 
in obtaining information about parole hearings and release dates of their assai-
lants. There also may be an increase in the use of victim impact statements. The 
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increased emphasis on victims' rights may lead to an increase in so-cal1ed vic-
tims' legislation. For example, compensation programs may become more "gener· 
ous" and legislation may mandate that victims have certain basic rights. In the 
future, the victims' rights movement win likely force changes in the criminal 
justice system. It is a movement which has been gaining momentum and seeks to 
provide better treatment for crime victims and witnesses not at the expense of 
defendants, but rather to balance the scales of justice. 
VICTIM· WITNESS PROGRAMS IN VIRGINIA 
LOCALITY PROGRAM LOCATION 
Full-Time Programs: 
** Albemarle County Police Department 
** Alexandria Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Arlington County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
** Chesapeake Sheriff's Department 
** Hampton Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
LeesburglLoudoun County Local Government 
** Norfolk Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Portsmouth Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Richmond Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
** Roanoke City Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
RockbridgelLexington County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Virginia Beach Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Number of Programs: 12 
Partial Programs: 
Henrico County Sheriff's Department 
Lynchburg Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Montgomery County Private non-profit agency 
Suffolk Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Williamsburg Commonwealth's Attorney's Office 
Number of Programs: 5 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PROGRAMS IN VIRGINIA: 17 
** Full or partial funding through DCJS Grants 
Compiled by the Department of Criminal Justice Services 
805 East Broad Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
(804) 786-4000 
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VICTIM COMPENSATION THROUGH SENTENCING 
Frances L. Pierson· 
A crime victim in America is victimized twice: first, by an attacker and second, 
by a system which ignores crime victims and their needs. The criminal justice 
system designed to prevent crime and punish violations ignores the very citizens 
the system is designed to protect. This shortcoming has not escaped notice or 
criticism by legislators or the public.! A vocal force of crime victims has emerged, 
marshalling public opinion and political support to establish an active role for 
victims in criminal prosecutions.2 
Many factors combined to spark the crime victims' lobby. Citizens Mcame out· 
raged when they compared the careful treatment of accused felons given court· 
appointed attorneys and the indifference afforded the felons' victims.3 Victims felt 
dehumanized in criminal proceedings that treated their injuries as mere evi· 
dence.4 Many victims resented that their personal injury became a societal injury 
punished through the criminal justice system, leaving them to seek civil redress.5 
Those factors combined to create a general dissatisfaction with the justice sys· 
tern's treatment of crime victims. Given this dissatisfaction, the law followed the 
path predicted by Holmes, changing to correspond with the actual feelings and 
demands of the community.6 Thus, legislators responded with state victim com· 
pensation funds,7 crime victim restitution in sentencing,S probation9 and parole!O 
* Frances L. Pierson is a third·year law student at Marshall·Wythe School of Law. 
I 128 Cong. Rec. §3853·61 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statements of Senators Heinz, Laxalt, Jackson, 
Mitchell, Moynihan, Metzenbaum andChiIes); S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 
1982 U.S. Code & Ad. News 2515, 2516; Older Americans Fighting the Fear of Crime: Hearing before the 
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1981) (statement of Frank Carrington, 
Crime Victims Legal Advocacy Institute). 
2 Crime victim organizations vary from specific nationally oriented groups like the Victims' Assistance 
Legal Organization, Inc. (VALOR) and the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOV A) to 
local grassroots efforts like Project CARE (Community Advocacy Resource for the Elderly) in 
Yonkers, New York. Each organization provides information, guidance and publicity to help crime 
victims. 
3 Omnibus Victims Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary on S.2420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (statement of Virginia Montgomery), "There is no one to 
represent me, the victim. Everyone in the system seems to only care about the assailant. I have felt 
like I am down in a hole with no way of getting out." Id. at 66 (statement of Senator Heinz). 
4 Id. at 187. 
5 Id. at 189, "It killed me when I got a subpoena saying, the State v. ___ . He didn't do shit to 
the state, he did it to me and what he did to me was swept under the rug!" 
6 O. Holmes, THE COMMON LA W 41 (1881). 
1 Ramker and Meagher, Crime Victim Compensation: A Survey of State Programs, Fed. Probation, Mar. 
1982 at 68. See also Lamborn, The Methods of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1971 
U. Ill. L.F. 655 (comparing different methods of administering a compensation program), Note, State 
Legislation in Aid of Victims and Witness of Crime, 10]. Legis. 394 (1983) (highlights victims' prob· 
lems with procedure and suggests basic improvements), Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1983). 
8 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17·28·101 (1973); Iowa Code Ann. § 907.12(2)(WEST 1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
17·A, § 1151(2)(Pamphlet 1982); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.021 (Vernon Supp. 1982); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
31·17·1A (Pamphlet 1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A·28·1 (1979). But cf Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
17·A, § 1321 (pamphlet 1982). 
9 Va. Code § 19.2·305(Supp. 1982). For an exhaustive listing of state probation statutes suggesting or 
mandating victim restitution, see Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the 
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 52, 69 nn. 109·11 (1982). 
10 Ga. Code Ann. § 17·14·4 (1983). See generally Read, How Restitution Works in Georgia, 60 Judicature 
323 (1977). 
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programs aiding victim restitution and, on the federal level, the Probation Actll 
and the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982.12 
Underlying these actions rests the belief that the justice system should recog· 
nize the rights of victims in the criminal law process. The degree of victim 
involvement may vary from active participation in the trial preparation 13 and the 
pre·sentencing investigation to passive acceptance of procedural information and 
social services aid. 14 In a justice system designed to protect and vindicate society, 
each party should be present: the offender, the society as prosecutor, and the 
society as victim. 
The injured citizen, the convicted felon and the justice system benefit from the 
involvement of the victim in the judicial process. Bringing the victim into the 
criminal process removes some of the crime's emotional impact as the citizen sees 
his injury vindicated through the legal process.15 Including the victim also 
removes his fear of the unknown, the courtroom and the trial process, as a doctor 
quiets a patient's fears about pending surgery. A victim who is involved in the 
prosecution from the first complaint to sentencing is more likely to feel justice 
has been served and is more likely to have a favorable impression of the justice 
system. 16 
The convicted felon benefits when the victim has an active role. Many felons 
undoubtedly view their victims as nameless "pigeons." Bringing the victim into 
the process personalizes the crime and forces the offender to see the human cost 
of his action. 17 Restitution as part of the criminal sentence goes further to quan· 
tify the extent of the injury. IS Some social psychologists support restitution as a 
means of eliminating the criminal's distress at committing an unjust act. 19 Given 
the option of justifying his criminal behavior or compensating his victim, a felon 
is more likely to become rehabilitated through victim restitution.20 The felon 
II 18 U.S.C. S 3651 (1982). The restitution provision dates from the Federal Probation Act's revision 
June 25, 1948, ch.645, 62 Stat. 842. See generally Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943)(reviews 
origins of the Federal Probation Act. 
12 Pub. L. No. 97·291; 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 1501, 1512·15,3579,3580 
(1982)). 
1J Active participation could include the victim as a witness and a willing information source during the 
investigation rather than a perfunctory appearance at trial. Victims may actively participate in the 
presentence report through the Victim and Witness Protection Act's addition to the Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(c)(2), see supra note 12. 
14 State compensation funds typically act like an insurance recovery with a fixed deductible and ceiling. 
The victim reports the crime, submits a detailed voucher to the compensation fund authority and 
waits for the check, see supra note 7. 
15 Victims Protection Act hearing, supra note 3 at 190·91, see aLso infra note 17. 
16 Id., Older Americans Fighting the Fear of Crime hearing, supra note 1 at 67. 
17 Zehr and Umbreit, Victim Offender Reconciliation: An Incarceration Substitute?, Fed. Probation Dec. 
1982 at 65·6. 
18 Offenders tend to underestimate the extent of their victims' loss, either out of ignorance or self· 
justification. See Hudson, Galaway and Chesney, When CriminaLs Repay Their Victims: A Survey of 
Restitution Programs, 60 Judicature 313,316 (1977). 
19 Id. at 317. "Restitution can aid an offender's rehabilitation by strengthening the individual's sense of 
responsibility. The probationer may learn to consider more carefully the consequences of his or her 
actions. One who successfully makes restitution should have a positive sense of having earned a 
fresh start and will have tangible evidence of his or her capacity to alter old behavior patterns and 
lead a law·abiding life." Huggett v. State, 83 Wis.2d 790,794, 266 N.W.2d 403,407 (1978). The criminal 
should understand the extent to which he has harmed the victim as a human being. People v. 
Richards, 17 Cal.3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d 97,100·101,131 Cal. Reptr. 537, 540·41 (1976). 
20 Hudson, Galaway and Chesney, When Criminals Repay Their Victims: A Survey of Restitution Pro· 
grams, Fed. Probation Feb. 1977 at 317. 
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should participate in the restitution evaluation for the payment to aid rehabilita-
tion_ 21 If the felon does not equate the payment with the costs of his actions, 
restitution becomes another criminal fine_22 
The benefit to the justice system from active victim involvement can be mea-
sured in the number of crimes reported_ Alienated victims do not report crimes; 
they seek to limit their losses by ignoring the offense.23 If victims believe they will 
be treated fairly, they will be more apt to report crimes and cooperate with the 
police investigation and the ensuing prosecution.24 Because eighty-seven percent 
of all crimes come to police attention through victim reports, public opinion about 
victim treatment is crucial,25 
Thus, victim involvement may take many forms: knowledge of th~ proceeding, 
assistance by state compensation funds, contributions to the presentence investi-
gation, appearance at the sentencing hearing and the recipt of restitution as a 
condition of sentencing, probation or parole. This article will analyze victim com-
pensation as one element of victim involvement, the policies underlying its pay-
ment and its method of administration. Each method of compensation has its 
shortcomings and must address problems such as offender's inability to pay, con-
stitutionally challenged restitution statutes and fiscal shortfalls of compensation 
funds. By focusing on the goal of helping the victim, this article will suggest 
solutions to finance and constitutionally administer restitution to improve victim 
compensation. 
I. RESTITUTION-A TRADITIONAL SANCTION REVISED 
Restitution's Historical Foundations 
Restitution is not a new remedy for criminal injury but an ancient sanction 
that fell into disuse after the division of criminal and tort causes of action. Victim 
compensation through offender restitution can trace its origins to the Code of 
Hammurabi,26 the Bible27 and Anglo-Saxon law.28 Early cultures recognized a sin-
gle injury when an individual harmed another, requiring a single payment of 
restitution by the offender to the injured party.29 This monetary payment com-
pensated the victim, or the victim's family, for personal injury or property dam-
age, averting vendettas through rough justice.30 
21 Supra note 17 at 65. 
22 [d. 
23 More than 70% of personal larcenies occurred without contact between criminal and victim and more 
than 60% of personal larcenies with victim-criminal contact are not reported to the police. Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics 1982 at 294. This reticence to report larcenies illustrates not only the 
public's lack of faith in police effectiveness, but also a reluctance to become a confused victim in the 
criminal proceedings. Applying the public's sense of cost-benefit analysis, reporting a crime is not 
worth the trouble. 
24 Victims Protection Act hearing, supra note 3 at 153 (citing the Final Report, Attorney General's Task 
Force on Violent Crime, Recommendation 62). 
25 [d. at 19l. 
26 Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 223,224 (1965)(Code 
of Hummurabi c. 2380 B.C.), Hobhouse, Law and Justice, in Considering the Victim 9 (1975). 
27 Exodus 21:18, 19 (restitution for personal injury), Exodus 22:1,5-6 (restitution for property damage). 
28 2 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, History of English Law 449-62 (2d ed. Washington, D.C. 1959Xlst ed. 
London 1895), F. Maitland and F. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History 6, 19-21, 193-99 (1915). 
29 Colson and Benson, Restitution as an Alternative to Punishment, II Det. C.L. Rev. 523 passim (1980), 
Wolfgang, supra note 20 at 223. For a succinct overview of early culture's application of restitution 
see Hobhouse, supra note 20. 
30 Wolfgang, supra note 26 at 223-26. 
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Early societies followed the simple logical precept: repair the injury and return 
the status quo. If this is not possible, harm the offender to the extent the victim 
was harmed:--retribution to achieve justice. Society's preference, victim restitu-
tion, more efficiently restored the status quo by redistributing gain rather than 
an additional loss through retribution. 
Victim restitution fell into disuse during the twelth and thirteenth centuries in 
England due in part to the sovereign's greed as well as the increasingly complex 
legal bureaucracy.31 Under Anglo-Saxon law, a statutory schedule of payments 
described the value of various injuries.32 This schedule ensured consistent resti-
tution. A killer would pay the wergild, or statutory sum, to the slain man's 
family. 
Gradually the system of payment became more sophisticated, requiring the 
offender to redress the injury twice: bot, or betterment, to the injured party, and a 
second payment, a wite, to the King for breaking the King's peace.33 Recovery 
became bifurcated because the King wanted to enrich the royal treasury. The 
combination of two payments, one to the victim and the other to the King, per-
ished due to over-elaboration; devising a fixed payment for each diverse injury 
became too difficult.34 As the use of the victim's bot declined, the King's share 
increased until the entire compensation became a fine payable to the Crown.35 
Injury compensation provided a principal source of state revenue but failed to 
recompense the victim or the victim's family.36 
Restitution's Modern Application 
The division between victim restitution and criminal sanctions continued 
unchallenged for hundreds of years. The introduction of probation in the late 
nineteenth century broke this precedent, providing the opportunity to require vic-
tim restitution as a probation condition.37 Victim compensation, however, 
remained as only a minor concern until 1951 when Margery Fry, a British magis-
trate, advocated a national crime victim compensation plan.38 Fry recommended a 
31 Wolfgang, supra note 20 at 228, B. Galaway and]. Hudson, Offender Restitution in Theory and Action 
16-17 (1977), Harland, supra note 9 at 52 and n.1. A complementary explanation for the criminal and 
tort division may be found in the twelfth century bureaucratization of the legal system. See S. Mil· 
som, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 404-28 (1981) for an overview of early criminal proce-
dure, and generally, for legal history theory that bureaucratic changes met unforeseen, far-reaching 
results. 
32 F. Maitland and F. Montague, supra note 28 at 193-99. For example, under the laws of King Aethel-
bert, A.D. 600,"if a man be slain, let him make 'bot' with XX shillings". /d. at 194. F. Pollock and F. 
Maitland, supra note 28 at 460-61. 
33 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, supra note 28 at 451, Wolfgang, supra note 26 at 225-26. 
34 /d., supra note 28 at 458-62, F. Maitland and F. Montague, supra note 28 at 20-21. 
35 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, supra note 28 at 459. The family of a slain man lost their right to receive 
the wergild. Parliament enacted a statute to give the family a right to claim civil damages, Lord 
Campbell's Act, Stat. 9·10 Vict. C.93.ld. at 459 & n.5. 
36 Wolfgang, supra note 26 at 228. Critics point to this same shortcoming in the United States criminal 
justice system, "Even where fines are imposed today, the state retains the proceeds, and the victim 
gets no compensation." ld. at 227 quoting Barnes & Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 401 (1943). 
As states enact victim compensation statutes, this criticism becomes less valid. 
At restitution's nadir the Parliament had to pass a statute, 21 Hen. VIII c.11, allowing a larceny 
victim to sue for restitution of his stolen goods because at common law the criminal indictment was 
at the King's discretion and did not include the victim. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 355-56 (1769). 
37 Harland, supra note 9 at 57. New York enacted an early victim restitution provision, N. Y. Code Crim. 
Proc. SS 483(2), 932 (McKinney 1910). ld. at 57 & n.33. 
38 L. Forer, Criminals and Victims 289-90 (1980), R. Meiners, Victim Compensation 9 (1978). For a brief 
insight into Fry's philosophy, See Fry,justicefor Victims in Considering the Victim 54 (1975). 
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national fund to insure citizens against losses due to crime in the same manner 
that workmen's compensation protects employees against work-related injuries_39 
Using these two new approaches to victim compensation, probation conditioned 
sentencing and a national compensation fund, victims could receive restitution 
directly from the offender through probation, sentencing or parole conditions, or 
receive restitution from a state compensation fund_ 40 State legislatures have 
adopted both methods_ Some states limit restitution to offender payments; others 
supplement payments with state victim compensation funds_ 41 None of these 
methods is problem-free_ 
On the federal level, Congress limits victim restitution to offender repayment 
The Federal Probation Act allows judges the discretion to include-victim restitu-
tion as a condition of probationY Congress augmented this infrequently used 
provision with the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 01WPA) which 
allows victim restitution as part of the criminal sentence_43 Restitution awards 
pursuant to this Act become a condition of parole_44 The VWPA's restitution pro-
visions faced a constitutional challenge in United States v_ Welden45 on equal pro-
tection, due process and seventh amendment grounds_46 
Congress' concern for budget deficits has thwarted the creation of a national 
victim compensation program_47 The budgetary obstacle has not only continued, 
but also worsened as the United States now faces a trillion dollar national debt 
With fiscal concerns removed, Congress probably would support some form of 
national victim compensation as evidenced by Congress' wide support for the 
VWPA,48 Congressmen's statements exhorting governmental responsibility for victims49 
39 Fry, supra note 38 at 55-6. 
40 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
41 See R. Meiners, supra note 33 at 25-39 .. See generally Lamborn, supra note 7. [insert example statutes]. 
42 18 U.S.C. § 3651. 
43 Pub. L. No. 97·291,96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512·15, 3579, 3580 (1982)). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 3579(g). 
45 568 F. Supp. 516 (1983). 
46 In Welden, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ruled the VWPA's 
restitution provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 violated the defendant's equal protection and due 
process rights due to the poor statutory drafting and the potential haphazard application. Equating 
the restitution award at the sentencing hearing with a civil trial for damages, the court also held this 
restitution award violated the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in a controversy with a value 
exceeding twenty dollars. 568 F. Supp. at 534·35. The government has appealed the decision in 
Welden to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
47 Introducing the VWPA's predecessor legislation, S. 2420, the Omnibus Victims Protection Act of 1982, 
Senator John Heinz laid out two parameters to victim assistance: no additional federal expenditures 
and no infringement on the constitutional rights of defendants. 128 Cong. Rec. S3853 (daily ed. April 
22, 1982)(statement of Sen. Heinz). Sen. Lawton Chiles also supported S.2420 and reiterated that the 
legislation did not entail additional federal funding. [d. at S3861. Given President Reagan's dramatic 
budget cutbacks, any new budget outlays faced almost certain disapproval. Thus, passage of the 
victim assistance legislation depended on a zero budget impact. 
48 The VWPA passed the United States House of Representatives by unanimous consent on October I, 
1982. 128 Cong. Rec. H8464-70 (daily ed. October I, 1982 Part III). 
49 "Clearly, there is an appropriate and necessary role for the Federal Government in addressing the 
problems encountered by crime victims." 128 Cong. Rec. H8207 (daily ed. September 30, 1982Xstate· 
ment by Rep. McCollum). "Enactment of Federal legislation in this area [victim assistance] must be 
one of the highest priorities of the 97th Congress." 128 Congo Rec. H8470 (daily ed. October I, 
1982)(statement by Rep. Fish). 
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and the political appeal of the victim assistance issue.5o Legislation introduced in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate seeks to overcome Congress' fiscal 
wariness by creating a crime victim assistance fund supported by judicially 
imposed criminal fines and compensation fees. 51 The United States Department of 
Justice would channel this money to federal crime victims as well as state com-
pensation programs.52 
II. VICTIM COMPENSATION'S WATERLOO: 
PROCEDURE AND FUNDING 
Each of the avenues for victim compensation contains pitfalls. Requiring victim 
restitution through criminal sentencing has met constitutional resistance.53 
Thus, sentencing procedures incorporating restitution must be improved and 
clearly explained so they may be fairly and constitutionally applied. Money and 
justice rarely can be equated, but in victim compensation, the offender's or the 
state's lack of funds means a victim will be left without recovery. Sources of 
funds need not be mutually exclusive. No reason exists to choose between 
offender fines, state payment and federal compensation. Indeed, combining differ-
ent funding approaches would improve the likelihood that all victims receive full 
compensation. 
Surmounting the procedural problems, noted in Welden, and the offender's and 
government's financial problems is possible if legislators, judges and criminal jus-
tice administrators endorse the concept of victim compensation. Many state and 
federal legislators appear to support victim restitution by offenders and, when 
financially feasible, governmental compensation funds. 54 Whether these legisla-
tors are motivated by public opinion backing victims' interests, potential reelec-
tion votes for supporting victim assistance or their personal belief that victim 
compensation is just, the result remains the same-support for compensation. In 
contrast, the judiciary appears divided.55 Some judges favor creative sentencing 
50 Introduced in an election year, the VWPA's predecessor legislation, S.2420, had sponsors ranging 
from conservative Utah Senator Orrin Hatch to the paradigm liberal advocate, Senator Edward 
Kennedy. S.2420's introduction on April 22, 1982, coincided with National Crime Victims' Week (128 
Cong. Rec. S3853 (daily ed. April 22, 1982)(statement by Senator Heinz)) and immediately preceded 
President Reagan's Executive Order 12360 establishing a task force on victims of crime (Victims 
Protection Act hearing, supra note 3 at 85). 
51 S.704, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), H.R. 5124, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
52 Introduced by Senators Heinz and Grassley, S.704 provides a one time compensation fee for misde· 
meanors and felonies. The bill also authorizes up to a 100% surcharge on criminal fines, depending on 
the criminal's ability to pay, with the proceeds directed to the Crime Victim's Assistance Fund. In a 
letter to their colleagues, the Senators note that an estimated $45 to $125 million could be generated 
for the fund in 1983 (letter of March 9, 1983 on file at William and Mary Law Review office). 
53 United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (1983). See text, and accompanying notes. 
54 At least thirty states have statutes providing victim restitution as a probation condition. Harland, 
supra note 9 at 69 Ii.109. In a budget survey 1978·80, thirty states (some not included in the statutory 
compilation above) provided funding for crime victim compensation. Ramker and Meagher, supra note 
7 at 69. Federal support for compensation can be measured by the VWPA's passage and the introduc-
tion of S.704 and H.R. 5124, see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
55 Some judges advocate the rehabilitative use of restitution and its accompanying benefit to the victim. 
Judge Lois Forer, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, outlined the reasons for her support in her 
book, Criminals and Victims (1980). Using restitution as a parole condition, Judge Forer believed the 
victim receiving payment recognizes there is justice in the criminal justice system, the state saves 
incarceration costs and the offender, spared from prison, benefits by atoning for his or her crime. Id. 
at 296. Judge Forer added an economic purpose for restitution. Requiring restitution for crimes with 
monetary gain removed criminal profit and added a deterrent effect. [d. 
Justice Albert Kramer, District Court in Quincy, Massachusetts, operates a program called Earn-it 
which combines financial restitution and community service work. The program includes victim-
offender meetings at which restitution agreements are formed benefitting both parties. National Law 
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including vIctim restitution.56 Others adamantly oppose incorporating a civil 
remedy into a criminal setting,57 Like many legislators, criminal justice adminis-
trators, prosecutors and parole officials appear to appreciate the benefits of victim 
compensation in furthering criminal prosecutions and tailoring sentences to fit 
individual crimes. 58 
Improving the Imposition of Victim Restitution: 
Meeting the Constitutional Challenge 
The federal statutory authority for victim restitution as a sentencing condition 
was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Welden. 59 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Welden deGision, finding 
the VWPA did not violate the seventh amendment, the due process or equal pro-
tection clauses.6o Though the statute can therefore be constitutionally construed, 
amendments could clarify the challenged sentencing guidelines. Clearer rules of 
application would increase the restitution provisions' usefulness and the fre-
quency of judicially imposed restitution. 
United States v. Welden marked one of the first times a federal judge attempted 
to apply the VWPA's restitution provisions.6l The three Welden defendants kid-
napped a woman, raped her and murdered her boyfriend.62 Upon their conviction, 
the judge sought to apply the new statute, balancing the defendants' ability to 
pay with the victims' injuries.63 The judge, noting a host of unanswered ques-
tions and criticizing Congress' poor draftmanship, found that sections 3579 and 
Journal, Aug. 23, 1982 at 1, col. 2. 
Other judges feel restitution should not be allowed in criminal cases. "Disposing of civil liability 
cannot be a function of restitution in a criminal case." People v. Richards, 17 Cal.3d 614,620, 552 P.2d 
97, 101, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537,541 (1976). "If one makes use of the criminal law for some collateral or 
private purpose, such as to compel the delivery of property or payment of a debt rather than to 
vindicate the law, he is guilty of a misuse of process, and a fraud upin the law." People v. Moore, 43 
Mich. App. 693, 697, 204 N.W.2d 737,739 (1972)(quoting Hall v. American Inv. Co., 241 Mich. 341, 353, 
217 N.W. 18,20 (1928). For these and further criticisms of restitution in criminal cases, see Harland, 
supra note 9 at 54 & n.l3. 
56 L. Forer, Criminals and Victims 289 (1980). 
57 This Note will show that restitution through sentencing is not a civil remedy. See infra notes ..... and 
accompanying text. But cf People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 552 P.2d 97, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1976); 
State v. Scherr, 9 Wis.2d 418, 101 NW.2d 77 (1960)(comparing restitution to a civil remedy). 
58 "We strongly agree that restitution should be a sentencing tool available in all criminal cases-not 
only where sentences are probated." Omnibus Victims Protection Act hearing, supra note 3 at 92 
(statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
"The victim impact statement enriches the presentence report by providing the judge information of 
a type and quality provided by no other means ... By supplying correct and verified information 
concerning amounts of financial losses to the victim, it makes a more accurate restitution decision 
possible." Id. at 146 (statement of Paul R. Falconer, Chief U.S. Probation Officer, District of Mary· 
land). "On the practical side, victims and witriesses plan [sic 1 an indispensable role in our criminal 
justice system. As practitioners, we need to encourage their cooperation to the maximum extent 
possible." Id. at 163 (statement of Michael McCann, District Attorney of Milwaukee County, 
Wisconsin). 
59 568 F. Supp. 516 (1983). 
60 743 F.2d 827 (1984). 
61 The judge, in orally announcing the decision, noted, "I don't expect to be the last court to speak on 
this question, but it looks like I'll be the first." 568 F.Supp. at 535-36. 
62 568 F. Supp. at 517, 525. One of the victims, Miss Calloway, had been struck on the head with a 
shotgun, had seen her boyfriend dead on the floor of their home, had been stripped naked and threa· 
tened with death, and was twice made to engage in oral sex while bleeding profusely from her head 
wound. [d. at 525. The victim impact statement estimated her damages at $599. [d. 
63 VWPA restitution provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a). 
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3580 of the Act violated the fifth amendment's equal protection and due process 
provisions and the seventh amendment's right to a jury trial on the issue of dam-
ages_64 Although the Eleventh Circuit found these sections constitutional, the dis-
trict court judge's dilemma highlights problems in imposing victim restitution_ 
The court in Welden found the restitution provisions violated due process and 
equal protection because they lacked sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure 
consistent results_65 Though the court acknowledged that the federal statute 
allowing probation with victim restitution was not unconstitutionally vague des-
pite indefinite standards,66 the court found "a crucial distinction" between proba-
tion and sentencing_67 Citing the probability of disparate results, the court ruled 
the statute violative of equal protection.68 Given the indefinite procedural guide-
lines for imposing victim restitution, the court ruled the statute also violated the 
Due Process Clause.69 
The major error in the court's reasoning, and the flaw which still threatens the 
64 568 F. Supp. at 534-35. 
65 "This Court thinks that Congress granted too much discretion to the courts and to the Attorney 
Gerieral, and, by exceeding its powers of delegation, created a potential Frankenstein." Id. at 534. 
66 Id. at 534. In United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1977), the court held the Probation Act 
was not unconstitutionally vague. Further, the court held that delegation of discretionary powers did 
not need precise standards supporting Congress' determination that effective sentencing required 
broad discretion. 429 F.2d at 1347. This decision undermines the court in Welden's requirement of 
ascertainable standards (emphasis added). 568 F. Supp. at 534. 
67 568 F. Supp. at 535. The court failed to elaborate on the difference between restitution as a condition 
of probation and restitution as a sentencing condition. In probation and sentencing hearings, the 
defendant may be given an opportunity to review the probation service's presentence report. Fed. R. 
Grim. P. 32(c)(3). The offender also may address the court before sentencing to present any informa· 
tion in mitigation of punishment. Fed. R. Grim. P. 32(a)(I). Accord, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 
(1962); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). 
In Welden, the court criticized restitution as a sentencing condition enforceable as a civil judgment. 
568 F. Supp. at 535, 18 U .S.C. § 3579(h). Restitution as a probationary condition also may be enforced 
as a civil judgment. 18 U.S.C. § 3651. However, in Bearden v. Georgia, . U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2065 (1983), 
the Court held failure to pay probation-conditioned restitution, was not a ground for cancellation of 
probation because petitioner, an indigent, had made a bona fide effort to pay. This decision may 
militate against civil enforecment measures such as contempt to press restitution sentencing awards 
against indigents. The VWPA's mandate that judges consider the defendent's ability to pay lessens 
potential enforcement problems. 
68 568 F. Supp. at 535. Justice Frankfurter addressed the problem of disparate results in Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 524 (1947), " ... diversity in result for similar conduct in different trials under the 
same statute is an unavoidable feature of criminal justice. So long as these diversities are not 
designed consequences but due merely to human fallibility, they do not deprive persons of due pro-
cess of law." 333 U.S. at 535. 
Disparity in result inevitably will occur when different judges seek to balance the VWPA's factors 
of victim's financial loss, defendant's financial resources, defendant's financial needs and earning 
ability and the financial needs and earning ability of defendant's dependents. 18 U.S.c. § 3580(a). 
Balancing these factors requires judgment, not application of a statutory grid to determine restitu-
tion. The goal in restitution is not as much equal sentences as fair sentences and the VWPA's provi-
sions can achieve this goal. 
For theories of judicial interpretation of broad statutory language, see Frankfurter, Some Reflections 
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947), Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in 
Statutes, 30 Yale L.J. 437 (1921). 
69 568 F. Supp. at 535. The court criticized the lack of standards such as rules of evidence, rules of 
discovery, burdens of proof, requirements of notice and requirements of standing. Id .. Because resti-
tution comprises one part of the offender's sentence, the determination of restitution follows the 
same procedure as the general criminal sentence. Fed. R. Grim. P. 32. Thus, the judge reviews the 
presentence report, questions the defendant and hears any mitigating evidence the defendant may 
offer. Id .. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at a sentencing hearing. 568 F. Supp. at 534. 
If restitution's award was a civil hearing, criticism regarding this procedural vagueness would be 
valid. However, restitution is not a civil award, but a component of the criminal sentence designed to 
further rehabilitation while aiding the crime victim. 
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concept of victim restitution, is that restitution through sentencing is the consti· 
tutional equivalent of a civil suit for tort damages,7o The goals and purposes of 
these two recoveries are different and should not be confused. Restitution 
through sentencing is a form of criminal punishment like a fixed term of incar· 
ceration.71 Within minimum and maximum terms of punishment, criminal sent· 
ences for the same offense can vary drastically. The sentence varies depending on 
the offender's past criminal record, the sentencing judge's attitude on incarcera· 
tion, the offender's likelihood of rehabilitation and other mitigating and aggravat· 
ing circumstances outlined in the presentencing report,72 Variations in sentences 
are not aberrations. They are the desired result of a criminal sentencing process 
that seeks to tailor each sentence to each individual crime. Victim restitution, 
equally variable, upholds the same goal because it tailors the amount of restitu· 
tion to each crime, considering the financial needs and ability of the offender and 
the victim's injuries. 
Congress did not intend to substitute victim restitution through sentencing for 
a victim's civil suit for tort damages.73 The civil suit remains as a remedy in 
which the victim's recovery is unhampered by considerations of defendant's abil· 
ity to pay,74 Restitution is a part of the criminal senten~e, supported by penal and 
rehabilitation theories.75 The sentencing judge retains the same discretion in 
awarding restitution as other sentencing sanctions.76 
The court in Welden accurately noted the absence of standards for rules of 
evidence and discovery in assessing restitution, but this shortcoming does not 
render the application of restitution procedurally unconstitutional. The law 
70 568 F. Supp. at 534. "The value in controversy ... exceeds twenty dollars, and § 3579(h) turns a 
restitution order into a civil judgment." /d. This VWPA section allows a restitution order to be 
enforced "in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action." 18 U.s.C.§ 3579(h). If the court in 
Welden:s analysis accurately characterizes restitution as a civil judgment, then all federal criminal 
fines and penalties are also civil judgments for under 18 U.S.c. § 3565 these fines and penalties are 
enforceable "in like manner as judgments in civil cases." 18 U.S.c. § 3565 (1982). 
71 VWPA's restitution provisions, SS 3579, 3580, joined the other sentencing provisions of Title 18, 
Chapter 227, Sentence.Judgment and Execution because restitution is a sentencing condition. A just 
sanction for the offender should ensure that the wrongdoer repair his or her victim's harm. S.Rep. 
No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982). 
72 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244·52 (1948); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979). 
"Would that a simple algebraic formula consisting of the crime, times the defendant's history, times 
extenuating circumstances, which would equal the proper sentence, be productive of universally fair 
sentences; were this the case, the courts should be the first to welcome its adoption. In actual prac· 
tice the rationale of sentencing is not that simple-nor should it be." Id. at 153-54. See also Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32 (presentence report submission and availability to defendant). 
In United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., Inc. 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court, using the 
Probation Act to impose creative sentencing, required six wholesale bakeries charged with Sherman 
Act violations to donate fresh baked goods to needy organizations. 
73 128 Congo Rec. H8205 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982)(section·by·section analysis of companion bill H.R. 
7191)"Subsection (c) of new section 3579 precludes the court from ordering restitution if the proce· 
dures necessary to issue the order will undly prolong or complicate the sentencing process. This is 
necessary to insure that the sentencing process does not become a sort of mini·civil trial for dam· 
ages. "(emphasis added). 
74 A victim may recover damages for criminal actions in a civil suit if the victim can show the defend· 
ant's action proximately caused the injury and the amount of damage suffered with the reasonable 
certainty. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 148·49 (1973). VWPA provision 18 U.S.c. § 
3579(e)(2) provides a set off against later civil awards for any restitution payments. 
75 Restitution's rehabilitative function makes the offender of his or her wrongdoing and gives an oppor· 
tunity for atonement, see supra notes 17·19. Restitution also penalizes the offender similarly to a 
criminal fine but the proceeds go to the victim rather than the government. See generally, E. Pincoffs, 
The Rationale of Legal Punishment 69 (1966)(principles to consider in sentencing a criminal). 
76 See supra notes 62 and 71. 
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allowing probation with restitution77 contains no guidelines, yet has been found 
constitutionalJ8 Victim restitution through sentencing has some guidelines and 
follows the United States Supreme Court's requirement that procedural due pro-
cess provide an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaning-
ful manner. "79 The convicted felon and his or her attorney has an opportunity to 
address the court before sentencing' to present information in mitigation of pun-
ishment.80 Government counsel has a similar opportunity to speak.81 The court 
also receives information from the presentence report which details among other 
things the victim's needs.82 
At this hearing, the court resolves any dispute as to the amount of restitution 
by a preponderance of the evidence.83 The defendant bears the burden of proving 
his or her financial needs and resources.84 Government counsel represents the 
victim's interest and bears the burden of providing losses.85 
Admittedly, the VWPA's provisions offer a judge broad discretion in arriving at 
an award figure. In Welden, this latitude troubled the judge who was faced with 
an incomplete presentence report86 and three defendants with limited assets.87 
But a poorly prepared report should not condemn a valid statutory provision. 
Rather courts should promote effective administration of court procedure by 
encouraging more complete investigations. That some information may be missed 
despite a probation officer's best efforts but glaring omissions, like Mr. Hill's 
death as a victim, should not be condoned. 
The court presented a litany of unanswered questions to highlight the provi-
sion's latitude and, implicitly, to criticize the vagueness of the provision's deliber-
ately flexible sanction.88 Answering a few of these questions will show how the 
VWP A can be constitutionally construed and applied. 
Question. If the court is dealing with more than one defendant 
should it apportion the restitution amount between the defendants 
on the basis of their degrees of guilt, or on the basis of their ability 
to pay, or some other basis or bases?89 
77 The Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3651 (1982). 
78 United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1977). See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
79 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
For a review of hearing procedure, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 
535 (1971), Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
In addressing the Probation Act's broad guidelines, the United States Supreme Court noted, "[Dlue 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
80 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1). 
81 !d. 
82 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(D). 
83 18 U.S.C. S 358O(d). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 568 F. Supp. at 525. The crime in Welden involved three victims: Miss Calloway, beaten, abducted 
and forced to engage in oral sex; Mr. Hill, killed during Miss Calloway's adbuction; and Mr. Little, 
deprived of the car upholstery clipped as evidence of Miss Calloway's bloodstains. Id. The victim-
impact statement failed to mention either Mr. Hill's or Mr. Little's damages though both were vic-
tims under VWPA definition. 18 U.s.C. § 3579. 
87 568 F. Supp. 525-26. Welden's assets totaled $40,200 with $17,000 in liabilities. Allison's assets --' 
totalled $13,000 with $20,000 in debts. Satterfield claimed no assets though his lawyer stated Satter· 
field had a statutory right-to-redeem worth $12,000. Id. 
88 568 F. Supp. at 527. 
89 Id. 
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Answer. The court must balance the offender's culpability 
with the degree of victim's injuries and the offender's ability to 
pay. If the court looked primarily to the offender's ability to pay, 
then greater emphasis would be placed on the victim's complete 
financial recovery. Instead, the court should weigh an offender's 
culpability and ability to pay to arrive at a figure which repre-
sents a sacrifice to the offender similar to the victim's degree of 
injury. A small sum from an impoverished burglar may not 
repay the victim's total losses, but it will aid the criminal's 
rehabilitation by bringing the theft to his terms as well as rec-
ognizing the victim's loss. 
Question. Do the Federal Rules of Evidence apply during a resti· 
tution hearing? For instance, is "hearsay" admissible?90 
Answer. As the court in Welden accurately noted, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings.91 
Because restitution is a sentencing sanction, the restitution part 
of the hearing also does not follow the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. A jury already found the defendant guilty in a trial con-
ducted according to the Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent 
juror prejudice, bias and misunderstanding. The sentencing 
judge, acting without evidentiary proscriptions, may weigh the 
value of all facts and testimony such as the offender's previous 
criminal record, family background and general character. 
These factors are irrelevant to determine guilt but they give the 
judge insight to tailor a sanction both penal and rehabilitative. 
The starting point to answer the court's questions must be the constitutional 
protections for the accused. Sentencing hearing guidelines, albeit broad, provide 
due process. Instead of returning to a wergild statutory payment schedule,92 judi-
cial discretion promotes equal protection, shaping the restitution award to fit the 
crime so each offender receives a fair sentence tailored to his or her particular 
crime. In this respect, equal protection means equal fairness, not identical 
sentences. 
With constitutional protections secured, the next analysis should incorporate 
the policies behind victim restitution.93 The strong support for victim compensa-
tion emphasizes the policy supporting judicial acknowledgment of victim's 
needs.94 This support for victims, however, should be tempered. Despite due pro-
cess protections, the defendant faces a loss of property based on government 
counsel's statements and the presentence investigation of victim's losses. Because 
the award determination imprecisely measures defendant's needs and ability to 
pay against victim's injuries, and because the victim retains the right to sue for 
civil damages, the court should err on the side of the offender in awarding 
restitution. 
90 Id. at 528. 
91 /d. at 534. 
92 See supra notes 32·36 and accompanying text. 
93 In his treatise, The Rationale of Punishment, Bentham observed that no punishment cold be tailored 
more equally than criminal fines because the quantum of fine can be "proportioned to the means 
which the delinquent has of bearing it.]. Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment 254 (1830). 
94 Congress' main consideration appeared to be victim compensation. 128 Cong. Rec. S3853·-3863 (daily 
ed. April 22, 1982) Restitution, however, joined other sentencing provisions with all the accompany· 
ing sentencing goals of vengeance, deterrence, restraint, compensation (j. Bentham, supra note 92 at 
4) and rehabilitation. L. Forer, Criminals and Victims 298 (1980). Thus, both victim and offender 
considerations need to be balanced. 
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In Welden, the court found the VWPA's provisions unconstitutionally violated 
the defendants' fifth amendment rights to equal protection and due process and 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial for a controversy exceeding $20 in 
value.95 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Satterfield, reversing Welden, rejected 
this view. In comparing restitution through sentencing with restitution through 
probation, both sanctions meet the Supreme Court's broad requirements for equal 
protection and due process.96 Because restitution through sentencing is not a civil 
damages award, the seventh amendment jury requirement does not apply.97 
Therefore, the VWPA restitution provisions are not constitutionally invalid. 
Policies supporting victim restitution sentencing 
Though the VWPA's broad restitution provisions pass constitutional muster, 
they are nonetheless indefinite guidelines requiring thoughtful judicial applica· 
tion. The statute less clearly defines the manner of assessing the defendant's 
financial situation and gives the judiciary limited guidance to balance these two 
figures in arriving at a just award.98 Reviewing the policies promoting victim 
restitution may offer insight to answer the questions left open by the broad statu· 
tory language. 
The VWPA introduces concern for the victim into the sentencing process via 
restitution. The sanction remains a sentencing alternative, however, and so sen-
tencing policies should receive primary emphasis.99 The goals of sentencing are 
several, among them rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence and incapacitation. 100 
Restitution through sentencing promotes each of the above goals, furthering 
society's interest in criminal sentencing while aiding the victim. 
Restitution aids offender rehabilitation by giving the offender an opportunity to 
make amends for his or her crime. lol To be effective, the assigned restitution 
should be clearly defined, measurable and achievable. l02 Achievability of restitu-
tion ensures the offender will succeed in fulfilling the set goal and enjoy a sense 
of accomplishment. l03 An achievable restitution figure can be set if the court con-
siders the offender's ability to pay.104 
Without returning to the vindictive justice of "an eye for an eye,"105 restitution 
offers a more complete punitive sanction. lo6 Restitution through sentencing re-
dresses society's injury, a broken law, with incarceration, and redresses the vic-
tim's injury with financial compensation. Thus, restitution becomes an integrated 
95 Id. 
96 568 F. Supp. at 
97 See supra notes 77·79 and accompanying text. 
98 18 U.S.c. § 3579. 
99 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d), "The court shall impose an order of restitution to the extent that such order is as 
fair as possible to the victim and the imposition of such order will not unduly complicate or prolong 
the sentencing process." See also Harland, supra note 9 at 90 (balancing factors). 
100 W. lA/ave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 21 (1972). 
101 See supra notes 17·22 and accompanying text. 
102 Keve, The Therapeutic Uses 0/ Restition, in Offender Restitution in Theory and Action 61 (1977). See 
also Harland, supra note 9 at 122·26. 
103 In Huggett v. State, 83 Wis.2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978), the court criticized a repayment condition 
which would have taken twenty·seven years to repay, "[Cjonditioning probation on the satisfaction of 
requirements which are beyond probationer's control undermines the probationer's sense of respon-
sibility." Id. at 798-99, 266 N.W.2d at 407. 
104 18 U.S.c. § 3580(a). The VWPA includes defendant's current financial status and future earning 
ability as well as defendant's dependents' financial status. 
105 Exodus 21:24. 
106 See generally Schafer, The Restitution Concept of Punishment, in Considering the Victim passim (1975). 
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criminal sanction recognizing both society's and the victim's injuries. 
Requiring the offender to reimburse his victim adds a deterrent element to res-
titution, the discouragement of criminal gain. 107 This deterrent effect would be 
strongest in property crimes like larceny or embezzlement. los In assessing pun-
ishment, Bentham noted the "pain of privation occasioned by the loss ... of 
money."I09 Because man derives the main source of his pleasures from money,110 
the forfeiture of money through restitution is an additional punishment and a 
disincentive to commit offenses. 
Restitution's deterrent effect increases as judges become more willing to impose 
this repayment as an additional sanction.lll This increased likelihood presents 
another risk for the would-be offender to assess in computing both the odds of 
punishment and the severity of punishment. If offenders sense judges are more 
likely to impose hefty restitution awards instead of jail terms, then offenders may 
seek to mitigate victim injuries. ll2 This change in behavior would follow if 
offenders placed greater value on personal finances than potential prison time. 
Restitution does not further the goal of offender incapacitation. But, with the 
VWPA's adoption, restitution may accompany incapacitation because restitution 
can now be imposed with a prison sentence. ll3 Before the VWPA, courts were 
limited to restitution as a probationary condition which required the offender's 
release.ll4 Allowing restitution through sentencing removes the necessity for 
courts to choose between imprisonment or victim restitution with probation. 
After the offender has completed a partial sentence and parole is granted, the 
restitution award will attach as another parole condition. lls 
While furthering sentencing goals, restitution also benefits the victim, a newly 
recognized figure in criminal justice. Though the victim retains the option to sue 
civilly for damages, this remedy may be chimerical given the cost of prosecution 
and the mental anguish of reliving the crime for a second trial.l l6 Thus, allowing 
restitution through sentencing saves the victim the financial and emotional cost 
of a civil damage suit. The victim need not hire private counsel for a civil action. 
Instead, the prosecution represents the victim's interests at the sentencing hear-
ing without charge. Although restitution ordered at sentencing may be less than 
107 L. Forer, supra note 38 at 296. 
108 Id .. See also Gandy, Attitudes Toward the Use of Restitution, in Offender Restitution in Theory and 
Action 127 (1977)(given restitution's deterrent element, retributionist organizations can favor creative 
restitution). 
109 ]. Bentham, supra note 92 at 254. 
110 Id. at 255. 
III Despite a victim's right to sue for civil damages, few victims pursue a civil remedy, though this 
hesitancy may be changing. Older Americans Fighting the Fear of Crime hearing, supra note 1 at 
158·62. But see In re Harrel Brooks v. State, 393 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1981)(defendant erroneously prohi· 
bited from cross·examining victim in criminal trial regarding pending civil suit for damages arising 
from the same act); State v. Anonymous, 36 Conn. Sup. 9 (1980·1Xtwo casesXinvolves request for daily 
transcripts of criminal trial for use in civil suit). 
112 Assuming offenders at times proceed rationally, a necessary assumption for deterrence theory, then 
an offender aware of restitution may limit the amount of irreparable damage, i.e. choose theft over 
vandalism. 
113 18 U.S.C. § 3579(aXl), "[IJn addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law ... " 
114, 18 U.S.C. § 3651. 
llS 18 U.S.c. § 3579(g). 
116 Some victims are willing to endure the criminal trial and a civil trial to achieve justice. Mrs. Mary 
Knight, a rape victim, recovered a $365,000 judgment in 1976 against her two attackers. Older Amer· 
icans Fighting the Fear of Crime hearing, supra note 1 at 161. "[T]he purpose of this trial wasn't to 
collect. The purpose of this trial was that it's high time somebody got off their tail and did something 
about 'rape' ... " Id. quoting Washington Post, Feb. I, 1976, Section B, at 1, col. 6. 
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a civil damage award, the victim still receives compensation. For lower income 
victims ineligible for legal aid, the prosecution's advocacy may be the best 
alternative. 
By providing an alternative forum for reparation, restitution through sentenc· 
ing can promote judicial efficiency. The VWPA minimizes the judicial cost of the 
subsequent civil trial, and these suits may be abandoned altogether if victims are 
satisfied with their restitution awards. In the first instance, the VWPA promotes 
judicial efficiency by minimizing issue relitigation; the criminal conviction "shall 
estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the offense."1l7 
In the second, a crime victim may prefer not to pursue a civil action with a 
possibly generous judgment,1l8 in favor of smaller restitution awards1l9 with no 
additional time or emotional commitment.120 
Financing Victim Compensation: A Treasure Hunt for Victim Compensation 
Even if restitution sentencing meets constitutional requirements and can be 
fairly administered, the victim may still be left holding the bag, an empty bag. 
Though the first goal of restitution sentencing should be to include the victim in 
the criminal process, the second must be to promote meaningful compensation. 
The first result, victim participation is good; the second, victim reparation, is 
better. 
Financing victim compensation requires money from offenders, the state or 
federal governments or private insurance. Ideally, the offender should pay the 
entire cost of making his victim whole. When the offender lacks sufficient funds, 
private insurance or government compensation programs should be available to 
supplement the deficit. 
Problem of the Indigent Offender 
In the ideal restitution sentence, the offender would fully compensate the vic-
tim for all injuries. Full repayment by the offender would promote the rehabilita-
tive and penal goals of restitution and would ensure that the victim did not suffer 
a financial loss due to the crime. Unfortunately, most offenders do not have 
unlimited resources,121 so courts must balance the offender's ability to pay 
against the victim's injuries.122 
The problem of partial offender restitution arises if the offender has limited 
funds or if the victim suffered expensive losses. Though many offenders are 
poor,123 some are financially able to pay the full restitution amount. 124 Even if the 
offender has modest resources, restitution remains possible for the majority of 
Il7 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e). 
liB See supra note 115. 
119 Restitution awards through sentencing are likely to be smaller given the absence of punitive damages 
and the balancing requirement of defendant's ability to pay. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a). 
120 See Kellogg, Making Criminals Pay, Fed. Probation, Sept. 1982 at 15. 
121 See Lamborn, Remedies for the Victims of Crime, 43 S. Cal. L. Rev. 22, 37-39 (1970). Using court-
appointed counsel as a measure of indigency, Lamborn noted 43% of all persons tried for felonies 
received court-appointed defense counsel. [d. citing L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor 7·8 (1965). 
122 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a)(VWPA balancing test); see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 120. 
124 United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1983)(defendant convicted of bank embezzlement 
ordered to pay $14,119.06 in restitution). In a 1978 survey of the Victim Services Agency Brooklyn 
restitution program, 59% (360 defendants) completed restitution payments. Zalichin, Schraga and 
Chytilo, Restitution in Brooklyn and Bronx Criminal Courts: A Victim·Oriented Approach, in Victims, 
Offenders and Alternative Sanctions 125 (1980). 
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minor property crimes such as burglary and purse-snatching. '25 Thus, restitution 
only presents a problem when the victim's losses exceed the offender's financial 
resources. 
An indigent offender may still pay victim restitution through participation in a 
prison or probationary work program_ Few, if any, prisons administer a job pro-
gram which could generate earnings for victim compensation. '26 Some restitution 
analysts have criticized this shortcoming in penal programs noting inmate 
employment could teach job skills, supplement the costs of incarceration and pro-
vide income from which to pay victim restitution. 127 Two states, Minnesota and 
Georgia, pioneered restitution probation programs enabling offenders to work and 
either repay their victims directly or indirectly through community service_128 
The preferred result from the victim's point of view would be direct payment, but 
even the VWPA provides that victims may nominate an alternative beneficiary to 
receive restitution through services in lieu of money.129 
Though indigent at sentencing, an offender may receive funds after sentenc-
ing. '3o Victims of the "Son of Sam" killer, David Berkowitz, can have their civil 
damage judgments satisfied from a royalty escrow fund established by the New 
York legislature_l3l The VWPA also requires the Attorney General to report to 
Congress regarding laws to ensure a federal felon does not profit from the sale of 
the story of his crime_132 Despite the rarity of criminal story royalties, this money 
should be made available for victim restitution on a regular sentencing basis.133 In 
a macabre sense, the victim equally earned the royalty through his death or injur-
ies. Allowing royalty capture gives courts an additional source of restitution fund-
ing without tapping private insurance or public governmental resources_ 
Alternative Sources of Compensation Funding 
A victim faced with partial offender restitution must look to alternative sources 
of funds to pay his medical bills or replace stolen articles. Two options, private 
insurance and public victim compensation, provide reimbursement for loss_ The 
debate continues, however, on which funding source should bear the greater 
burden.134 
125 Thirty·nine percent of the larcenies committed in the United States in 1980 were for under $50, 33% 
were for $50·$200. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Dept. of Justice 376 (1982). 
126 Chesney, Hudson and McLagen, A New Look at Restitution: Recent Legislation, Programs and 
Research, 61 Judicature 348, 354 (1978). 
127 /d .. Some states authorize restitution from regular prison·labor income. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31· 
254(D)(2)(Supp. 1982·1983); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 944.49(2)(b), 945.091(5)(a)(West Supp. 1982); Md. Ann. 
Code art. 27, § 645 M(a)(3)(1982). 
128 See Hudson, Galaway an~ Chesney, supra note 18 at 313·14; Read, supra note 10. 
129 18 U.S.c. § 3579(b)(4). 
130 David Berkowitz, the "Son of Sam" killer, illustrates a convicted criminal who received royalty pay-
ments for the right to publicize his crime. The State of New York responded with a law, N. Y. Exec. 
Low § 632(a)(Consol. Supp. 1982), to establish a royalties' escrow fund from which his victims' civil 
damage judgments could be paid. Older Americans Fighting the Fear of Crime hearing, supra note 1 at 
161-62. 
131 /d. 
132 VWPA, section 7, 96 Stat. 1257. 
133 In jurisdictions where legislatures have enacted "Son of Sam" royalty laws, judges should include a 
royalty escrow provision as a standard practice in sentencing. The criminal remains free to exercise 
his first amendment right to tell his story. He is limited, however, in the ability to enjoy the economic 
fruits of his crime. 
134 See Wolfgang, supra note 26 passim, asserting a government responsibility exists to redress crime 
victims based on the gravity of the harm, not degree of need, because of the government's failure to 
protect its citizens. But see W. Luksetich and M. White, Crime and Public Policy 167·76 (1982), noting 
the free rider problem in state compensation programs and supporting private insurance. 
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Insurance should be the first alternative to supplement offender's partial resti-
tution because individuals should be encouraged to mitigate their damages before 
relying on public funds. 135 Also, many people already are insured against theft or 
physical injury making insurance a common source of victim compensation.136 By 
looking to insurance as the first alternative after offender restitution, courts and 
legislatures could save taxpayer dollars, prevent unjust enrichment through dou-
ble recoveries and equitably limit victim reimbursement with public funds to the 
victim's out-of-pocket 10sses.I37 
Not all victims carry insurance, however, so governments should establish a 
public victim compensation program to ensure crime victims do not suffer eco-
nomic harm as a result of their injuries. 138 Theories supporting government 
accountability for victim restitution range from a failure-to-protect thesis139 to the 
general notion of public welfare assistance.140 Regardless of rationale, placing the 
state as the final alternative for victim indemnification, after the offender and 
private insurance, spreads the cost of complete restitution over a broad sector 
thereby minimizing the individual cost of compensation protection. Having a 
state compensation program also ensures complete victim restitution. The victim 
is not left to hope the rapist or thug has reacheable assets. Nor is the victim 
forced to rely solely on his personal insurance. 
Though strong philosophical arguments support victim restitution based on 
harm rather than need,141 pragmatism requires a look at states' limited financial 
resources. 142 Given scarce state funding, more victims can be aided if state pro-
grams set a minimum level at which expenses will be reimbursed, for example 
$100, and require a showing of financial need. The needs test necessarily requires 
some middle-income victims to absorb the cost of their injuries. But this require-
ment would free restitution funds for other victims who cannot bear the 
increased financial hardship of their victimization. 143 
135 This idea conflicts with Wolfgang's thesis, supra note 26, that government should be the primary 
reimburser when offender restitution insufficiently compensates the victim. 
136 See Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1983)(deduction for insurance reimbursement); Lamborn, supra note 7 at 
32·3. 
137 Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4th passim (1983). 
138 Thirty states administer public victim compensation programs funded through a combination of 
criminal fines, criminal fine surcharges and tax dollars. See Ramker and Meagher, supra note 7. See 
also Note, State Legislation in Aid of Victims and Witnesses of Crime, supra note 7. 
139 See Wolfgang, supra note 26 at 232·34. 
140 See generally IV. Luksetich and M. White, supra note 133 at 175·76 (characterizing victim compensa· 
tion as a "merit good"). 
141 Wolfgang, supra note 26. 
142 For a list of state compensation budgets, see Ramker and Meagher, supra note 7 at 69. 
143 In 1980, 506,873 families with incomes less than $3,000 suffered burglaries. Families with incomes 
from $3,000 to $7,499 suffered 632,224 burglaries. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Dept. of 
Justice 307 (1982). 
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CONCLUSION 
Victim compensation through sentencing benefits the offender, the victim and 
the criminal justice system. The offender experiences the rehabilitative effect of 
personally redressing his crime and recognizes the human costs of his crime. The 
victim receives recognition of his injury through the criminal process and 
receives a monetary award to compensate, at least as much as money will allow, 
for his injuries. In the process of victim compensation, the justice system benefits 
through more cooperative victim/witnesses and an improved citizens' attitude 
toward judicial fairness and effectiveness. 
Because the offender's payment of victim restitution must be-tailored to the 
individual crime for maximum rehabilitative effectiveness, difficulties arise in 
fairly administering a flexible restitution policy. Due process and equal protection 
considerations require a consistent approach to victim restitution as a condition 
of sentencing, but this approach should emphasize first, sentencing goals of reha-
bilitation, punishment and deterrence, and second, victim reparation. If the goal 
of victim restitution, benefitting both offender and victim, remains a guiding star, 
then variable sentences will be the desired result rather than a tragic miscarriage 
of justice. . 
Funding victim compensation becomes a problem when the victim's losses 
exceeds the offender's ability to pay. This problem can be mitigated through 
offender work programs in prisons and parole activities. "Son of Sam" royalty 
legislation also can ensure that future offender windfalls will be subject to cap-
ture to compensate victims. 
When the offender falls short of full restitution, private insurance should aug-
ment victim compensation. As a final resort, public victim compensation funds, 
financed through criminal fines and tax dollars, should ensure that victims 
receive complete compensation. This latter alternative, government-sponsored 
restitution, may be limited to those victims who would experience a financial 
hardship without compensation. 
Restitution remains a viable option for redressing wrongs and punishing the 
offender. In its modest context of victim compensation through sentencing, resti-
tution goes further to include the victim in the minal justice process and give 
aggrieved victims a greater sense of justice and vindication. The value of victim 
compensation can be measured in increased victim respect for the justice system, 
transfer payments from offender to victim redressing criminal injuries and the 
rehabilitative and penal sentencing goals furthered by victim restitution. This 
value merits the effort to develop fair administrative procedures for victim resti-
tution and to fund victim compensation when the offender's finances fall short. 
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